Heartbreak at Hilbert’s Hotel by Hedrick, Landon
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of
2014
Heartbreak at Hilbert’s Hotel
Landon Hedrick
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, landon.hedrick@huskers.unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Hedrick, Landon, "Heartbreak at Hilbert’s Hotel" (2014). Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy. 37.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/37
Heartbreak at Hilbert’s Hotel
LANDON HEDRICK
Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA
e-mail: landon.hedrick@huskers.unl.edu
Abstract: William Lane Craig’s defence of the kalam cosmological argument
rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe.
In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the ‘Hilbert’s
Hotel Argument’ – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite
number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past.
After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting
those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of
presentism. The remainder of the article considers and rejects possible replies
on Craig’s behalf.
For more than three decades, William Lane Craig has been the leading
proponent of the kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God.
The argument is formulated as follows (Craig (a), ):
() Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
() The universe began to exist.
() Therefore, the universe has a cause.
After attempting to justify the premises of this argument, Craig sets out to analyse
what the cause must be like, given certain characteristics it must have. For
example, he says the cause must be uncaused, timeless, spaceless, and immaterial
(ibid., ). Allegedly, the only kind of cause that could plausibly fit this de-
scription would be a powerful, immaterial mind – just as God is supposed to be.
In this article I examine Craig’s case for premise (). In particular, I focus on
just one of the philosophical arguments he uses to establish that the universe
began to exist – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually
infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless
past. Let’s call this supporting argument Hilbert’s Hotel Argument (HHA, for
short). I begin by reviewing HHA, and follow by raising some initial doubts
about the controversial first premise, which states that ‘an actually infinite number
Religious Studies (2014) 50, 27–46 © Cambridge University Press 2013
doi:10.1017/S0034412513000140

of things cannot exist’ (ibid., ). After ultimately granting this premise for the
sake of argument, I show that the second premise presupposes the falsity of a
plausible metaphysical theory about time: presentism. Furthermore, Craig
himself accepts presentism. It follows that, by his own lights, HHA should be
rejected. Moreover, I show that elsewhere in Craig’s defence of the kalam
cosmological argument he presupposes the truth of presentism, which means that
his defence of kalam is inconsistent. The remainder of the article critically
evaluates possible responses on Craig’s behalf. I conclude that Craig needs to
abandon HHA.
Before we turn our attention to HHA, I should make one preliminary
comment about the importance of HHA for Craig’s defence of the kalam
cosmological argument. In defending the claim that the universe began to exist,
Craig appeals both to empirical evidence as well as to two general philosophical
arguments, one of which is HHA. As I said, in this article I want to set aside
the empirical evidence and consider the merits of HHA. It might seem that
only empirical evidence from the fields of physics and cosmology could hope
to show that the universe began to exist, and that armchair philosophizing is
of no use in this project. So, by setting this evidence aside and just focusing
on a purely philosophical argument, one might get the impression that I am
attacking the weakest part of Craig’s case. However, I think this is a mistake. In
the first place, Craig takes the philosophical arguments to be more important
for his case than the actual empirical evidence. Moreover, he is interested in
showing that time itself – and, therefore, any physical world whatsoever – had
an absolute beginning. Yet it seems to me that this hypothesis is beyond the
purview of the empirical sciences. The important point for now is that, if I’m
right, then Craig’s case really rests heavily on his philosophical arguments for
premise ().
Initial worries for HHA
Let’s now turn our focus to HHA. Craig states the argument as follows
(ibid.):
(A) An actually infinite number of things cannot exist.
(A) A beginningless series of events in time entails an actually infinite
number of things.
(A) Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.
There’s supposed to be a close connection between (A) and premise () of the
kalam cosmological argument. By establishing (A), Craig thinks that he is thereby
supporting ().
Before we move on to evaluate Craig’s reasons for accepting (A) and
(A), it’s worth noting that the wording of this argument sometimes varies.
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For example, elsewhere, Craig spells out the argument as follows (Craig
(b), ):
(A*) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(A*) A beginningless series of equal past intervals of time is an actual
infinite.
(A*) Therefore, a beginningless series of equal past intervals of time
cannot exist.
Here there are three noticeable differences from the previous formulation of the
argument. First, instead of claiming that an actually infinite number of things
cannot exist, (A*) just says that ‘an actual infinite cannot exist’. Second, whereas
Craig talks about ‘events’ in (A), he instead talks about ‘intervals of time’ in (A*).
And third, (A) says that a ‘beginningless series . . . entails an actually infinite
number of things’’, but (A*) says that a ‘beginningless series . . . is an actual
infinite’. Despite these differences, I’ll speak loosely about HHA, allowing that to
name both of these arguments. I’ll consider (A)–(A) the first formulation of
HHA, and (A*)–(A*) the second formulation. Our primary focus will be on the
first formulation, but the second formulation will arise later in the discussion.
The justification for (A) is based on certain thought-experiments which
purport to show the absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing. By
‘actually infinite’ Craig means to be talking about ‘a collection of definite and
discrete members whose number is greater than any natural number , , ,  . . .’
(Craig (a), ). This is contrasted with a ‘potential infinite’, which is ‘a
collection that is increasing toward infinity as a limit but never gets there’ (ibid.).
So, according to Craig, if an actually infinite number of things existed, that would
have some absurd implications for the kind of world we live in. For example,
consider Craig’s favourite thought-experiment on this topic: Hilbert’s Hotel – a
hotel with an actually infinite number of rooms. Now we’re to suppose that a new
customer comes to the hotel asking for a place to stay when every room is already
occupied. In such a hotel, we merely need to shift everybody down a room (so the
person in room  moves to room , and the person in room  moves to room ,
etc.). Now room  is available for the new customer. This means that, even though
every room in the hotel is full, new guests can always be accommodated.
Moreover, if an actually infinite number of new customers all request a room, the
hotel can accommodate all of them. Each person who already has a room just
needs to move to the room that’s twice the number of his or her current room.
So the person in room  moves to room , and the person in room  moves to
room , etc. This empties out all of the odd-numbered rooms, and the infinity of
new guests can be accommodated. This could be repeated without end. In a world
with Hilbert’s Hotel and an unlimited supply of new guests (and an unlimited
supply of patience!), an infinite number of people can check into the already full
hotel every thirty minutes. This, Craig says, is absurd. Moreover, he claims that
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the thought-experiment can be made even more counterintuitive. Suppose
somebody checks out of the hotel. Now we have an empty room, yet the hotel is
still housing the same number of guests (because infinity minus one is infinity). In
fact, suppose everybody in an odd-numbered room checks out. In this case, an
infinite number of people have checked out, yet the same number of people
remain in the hotel as before (i.e. infinity). And if we don’t like having an infinite
number of empty rooms in our hotel, we can simply shift the remaining guests
around until all of the rooms are again occupied (ibid., –).
Let’s grant Craig (at least part of) what he wants us to take away from this
thought-experiment: Hilbert’s Hotel really is absurd, and it therefore cannot exist.
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that such a place is not a real metaphysical
possibility. Given that we’ve granted the absurdity of Hilbert’s Hotel, does it follow
that (A) is true? It certainly follows that it’s impossible for there to be a hotel with
an actually infinite number of rooms. It might even generalize to the conclusion
that it’s impossible for there to be any building with an actually infinite number of
rooms, or even more generally, that it’s impossible for there to be any concrete
object with an actually infinite number of equal spatial parts. Moreover, since
Craig has elsewhere run the same kind of argument to show that there cannot be
an actually infinite number of marbles, baseball cards, books, etc., let’s suppose
that the argument shows that there can’t be an actually infinite number of physical
objects. Better yet, let’s grant that there cannot be an actually infinite number of
concrete objects, physical or not.
Nevertheless, it is certainly not clear that (A), ‘an actually infinite number
of things cannot exist’, follows from the absurdity of Hilbert’s Hotel, at least if
abstract objects count as ‘things’. Consider numbers, for example. If a number is a
thing, and if there are an actually infinite number of them, then (A) is false.
Of course, some philosophers have held that numbers are things, and that there
are an actually infinite number of them. Let’s call such a view about numbers
‘Platonism’. In response to this worry, Craig reassures us that there are other views
which hold that, for example, numbers don’t really exist, or that there aren’t an
actually infinite number of them (ibid., ). But surely this response misses the
thrust of the worry. The obvious point to make is that if Platonism is correct, then it
follows that the Hilbert’s Hotel thought-experiment doesn’t prove (A). So it’s
Craig’s burden to show that Platonism must be false. Rather than merely point out
that we need not be Platonists, Craig needs to give an argument against Platonism.
He may think that Hilbert’s Hotel will suffice here, but I’m not at all inclined to
agree. Should we conclude that just because it would be absurd for an actually
infinite number of hotel rooms, marbles, baseball cards, or books to exist, that
it would be equally absurd for an actually infinite number of numbers to exist?
Or should we think that a suitably reformulated version of the thought-
experiment – say, ‘Hilbert’s Platonic Heaven‘ –would lead us to deny Platonism?
If we’re relying on intuitions alone here, it’s unclear whether the intuitions will
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carry over. It may well be that our intuitions are better suited to tell us about
concrete objects anyway.
As it turns out, the general conclusion that Craig draws on the basis of the
Hilbert’s Hotel thought-experiment, (A), rules out a number of other philoso-
phical theories as well. In addition to Platonism about numbers, one might believe
in an infinite number of other abstract objects – e.g. propositions, properties, sets,
possible worlds, etc. Alvin Plantinga, for example, believes that possible worlds are
abstract objects, and that there are an actually infinite number of them (Plantinga
(), ). Likewise, (A) entails that David Lewis’s modal realism view of
possible worlds is badly mistaken, since he believed in the existence of an infinite
number of concrete worlds. Moreover, some people have believed that space is
continuous, made up of an infinite number of points, but (A) seems to rule this
out as well. Craig considers this possibility, but he imagines that his opponent
must be trying to use this as a clear counterexample to (A). His response is to
point out that the notion that space is continuous is unproven (Craig & Sinclair
(), ). Seemingly, Craig thinks that it’s up to his opponent to prove it. But
again, Craig’s premise seems to entail that space is not like this, which is also an
unproven claim. True, if one could prove that continuous space is possible, then
we’d have a counterexample to (A). But since Craig is claiming that it’s not
possible, it’s reasonable to expect him to prove it.
We’re beginning to see that in order for HHA to go through, it has to settle a
number of controversial metaphysical debates. And we’re expected to think that
these debates can be resolved by the Hilbert’s Hotel thought-experiment, or
parallel thought-experiments. It seems that there is plenty of room here to doubt
that the absurdity of Hilbert’s Hotel proves (A). Perhaps what it actually proves
is something quite a bit more modest. Craig will undoubtedly point out that there
are independent reasons to reject Platonism about abstract objects, David Lewis’s
modal realism, and the rest. But notice that there are really two distinct problems
here. First, we can see that if any of these views are true, then Craig’s premise is
false. So Craig seems to have his work cut out for him in showing that all of these
various views are false. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, I want to
claim that whatever else can be said against these metaphysical views, we should
probably not think that the Hilbert’s Hotel thought-experiment disproves all of
them. So even if Craig does have good reasons to reject these views, this would not
show us that Hilbert’s Hotel provides us with a good reason to reject these views,
and therefore to affirm (A). At the very least, we should probably be hesitant to
accept (A) on the basis of Hilbert’s Hotel, given that it rules out a number of
plausible metaphysical views that have been held by some very intelligent people.
At this point I’m not quite sure what the full import of Hilbert’s Hotel actually is.
But having registered some of my worries, let’s suppose Craig is right to think that
the thought-experiment actually shows that (A) is true. I’m certainly dubious
about whether we can really make such a determination on the basis of the
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intuitions we get about the hotel, but I want to be as charitable to Craig here as I
reasonably can be in order to see where the argument goes from there.
When it comes to defending (A), Craig usually doesn’t have as much to say. In
addition to claiming that it’s ‘obvious’, he writes: ‘If the universe never began to
exist, then prior to the present event there have existed an actually infinite number
of previous events. Thus, a beginningless series of events in time entails an
actually infinite number of things, namely, events’ (Craig (a), ).
Craig doesn’t go into great detail explaining exactly what he means by an ‘event’,
but it’s apparently supposed to be an existing thing. It’s notable, however, that in
another context Craig seems to acknowledge a chasm between events, on the one
hand, and things, on the other:
Normally, we speak of something’s becoming this or that; but temporal becoming is
conceived to be absolute. ‘In the pure becoming of an event,’ demands Smart, ‘what does
the event become?’ . . . Smart’s question is strangely misconceived, however, for he himself
has repeatedly emphasized Broad’s point that it is things, not events, that come to be; an
event is just the coming to be of some thing or things. (Craig (b), )
If being a thing and being an event are different in this way, it’s unclear how HHA
is supposed to get off the ground in the first place. (A) tells us that there can’t be
an actually infinite number of things, and (A) tells us that a beginningless past
would entail an actually infinite number of events (read: events, not things). Craig
would need some additional premise to make the argument go through. For
example, he would need:
(IE) An actually infinite number of events cannot exist.
Then, of course, we would like to know what kind of justification there could be for
(IE). Hilbert’s Hotel wouldn’t work here, because it says nothing at all about
events.
It’s also worth pointing out that some philosophers have denied that events
exist. Terence Horgan, for example, argues that ‘it is a mistake to posit events at all’
on the grounds that, ‘despite the initial appearances, there is no real theoretical
need to posit events. So, since their elimination yields an important simplification
of ontology, we should banish them from existence’ (Horgan (), ). Similarly,
Peter van Inwagen writes: ‘There are, I would say, no events. That is to say, all
statements that appear to involve quantification over events can be paraphrased as
statements that involve quantification over objects, properties, and times – and the
paraphrase leaves nothing out’ (van Inwagen (), ). Craig himself agrees
that such a position is plausible, though it’s not clear to me whether he is willing to
endorse it. In (Craig (b), ), immediately after claiming that events are
among ‘the sorts of thing that many metaphysicians plausibly deny exist’, Craig
states: ‘These things are real in the sense that they are not illusory, but they are not,
properly speaking, existents.’ As it happens, this concession causes problems for
HHA, as will soon become apparent.
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Elsewhere, as already noted, Craig substitutes ‘intervals of time’ into the
argument in place of ‘events’. It’s certainly questionable whether an interval of
time is a ‘thing’ in the required sense. Things, at least of the non-eternal sort,
ordinarily come into and pass out of existence; intervals of time merely pass. On
the face of it, at least, it seems we’re talking about different categories altogether
when we use examples about hotel rooms and other physical objects and then
apply that reasoning to intervals of time. So I’m inclined to think that someone
who accepts the premise that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist has
some leeway in which he or she might deny that an event or interval of time is the
kind of ‘thing’ to which the argument applies.
Craig has claimed that ‘event’ just means ‘any change’ (Craig & Sinclair (),
). And presumably, a change involves a thing losing or gaining one or more
properties. Here again some of the same worries as before begin to crop up. Is a
change supposed to be a thing in the way that a physical object is a thing? If a
change is just something that happens to a thing, and is not itself a thing, then
for all I know there could be a possible world with a finite number of things
(i.e. objects) which nevertheless change an infinite number of times. Perhaps
there’s a world that just consists of a sphere that has been changing colours – say,
alternating between being red and being green – from eternity, and will continue
to do so forever. Howmany things exist at that world? Maybe just three: the sphere,
redness, and greenness. Here’s an alternative answer that, I suspect, most of us
would find counterintuitive: an infinite number of things exist at that world, since
in addition to the sphere and the properties of redness and greenness, you have to
count the infinite number of colour changes as existing things. If HHA convinces
Craig that there cannot be a world like the one envisioned, then it seems he would
endorse this counterintuitive answer to our question. Otherwise, it’s unclear why
Hilbert’s Hotel would allow us to conclude that there can’t be an infinite number
of changes.
Let’s nevertheless set that worry aside and assume that an event, whatever it is,
is a thing which exists – the kind of thing that Hilbert’s Hotel shows us to be limited
in number. Craig seems to want to say that to deny () is to suppose that an
actually infinite number of past events (or intervals of time, or changes) compose
the past. But given that we have seen that an actually infinite number of things
cannot exist, we must deny that there can be an actually infinite number of past
events. And to deny that is just to affirm ().
It’s important to pause here and consider exactly how HHA is supposed to work.
We’ve already accepted (for the sake of argument, at least) that an actually infinite
number of things cannot exist. Craig thinks that anybody who denies this will be
forced to accept an undesirable view. In his words: ‘It is indisputable that if an
actually infinite number of things were to exist, then we should find ourselves
landed in an Alice-in-Wonderland world populated with oddities like Hilbert’s
Hotel’ (Craig (a), –). So it looks like the argument is supposed to be
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construed in basically the following way: we know that an actually infinite number
of things cannot exist, so we should reject any view that entails that an actually
infinite number of things exist. But, as it happens, somebody who believes that the
universe is past-eternal is committed to saying that an actually infinite number of
things (namely, events) exist. Since this conflicts with what we know to be the case
(on the basis of Hilbert’s Hotel), we should reject that view. One way of
formalizing the argument would go like this:
(M) It’s metaphysically impossible for an actually infinite number of things to exist.
(B) The universe began to exist.
(B) If* (B), then* (M)
(B) (M)
(B) Therefore, (B)
Note that (M) simply paraphrases premise (A), and (B) is identical to premise ()
of the kalam cosmological argument. Now, when Craig defends HHA in order to
prove premise (), I think what he’s after is something like (B)–(B). Since the
conclusion of this argument is just (B), and since that’s precisely the same as (),
this way of formulating the argument at least has the virtue of making it clear how
it’s supposed to support (). Notice that on Craig’s rendering of HHA, it’s not
immediately clear what the connection is between (A) and (). Finally, keep in
mind that Craig’s reason for accepting (B) is that the falsity of (B) entails that an
actually infinite number of past events exist.
Problems from the metaphysics of time
It seems to me that, in making this argument, Craig is presupposing a
certain view about the metaphysics of time. As such, it would be good here to
distinguish briefly two competing theories in the current debate: the A-Theory and
the B-Theory. On the A-Theory of time, which is often referred to as the tensed or
dynamic theory, there is a real, objective difference between past, present, and
future. Generally, according to this view, the present has a privileged ontological
status. In fact, some philosophers have thought that the A-Theory is committed to
a doctrine called ‘presentism’. On that view, only the present is real. In Craig’s own
words, presentism is
the doctrine that the only temporal entities that exist are present entities. According to
presentism, past and future entities do not exist. Thus, there really are no past or future
events, except in the sense that there have been certain events and there will be certain
others; the only real events are present events. (Craig (b), )
Craig also seems to believe that A-Theorists are committed to presentism. For
example, in one place he apparently conflates the two views, writing: ‘According to
the A-Theory, things/events in time are not all equally real: the future does not yet
exist and the past no longer exists; only things which are present are real’ (Craig
(a), ).
 LANDON HEDR ICK
Elsewhere, in a discussion of McTaggart’s Paradox, he approvingly notes that
other thinkers have concluded that the A-Theory is committed to presentism:
Sharp-sighted critics of McTaggart such as C. D. Broad and A. N. Prior have insisted almost
from the beginning that a dynamic or tensed theory of time implies a commitment to
presentism, the doctrine that the only temporal entities that exist are present entities.
(Craig (b), )
Indeed, Craig believes that by accepting presentism, the proponent of the
A-Theory can avoid McTaggart’s Paradox, which would otherwise be a good
argument against the A-Theory. Thus, regarding certain versions of the A-Theory
which reject presentism, such as the so-called ‘growing block theory’ and the
‘moving spotlight theory’, Craig says that it’s ‘doubtful . . . whether these hybrid
theories are coherent’ (Craig (b), –). In Craig’s view, then, presentism
is simply the only viable version of the A-Theory.
The B-Theory, by contrast, is often referred to as the tenseless or static theory
of time. On this view, no point in time is ontologically privileged. As Craig puts it:
‘all events in time are equally real’ according to the B-Theory (Craig (a), ).
Therefore, the distinction between past, present, and future does not designate
anything of ontological significance; past events are just as real as present events.
Compared to Napoleon, William the Conqueror is in the past. But compared to
Julius Caesar, William the Conqueror is in the future. There is no objective fact
about whether something or somebody exists in the past, present, or future,
because those characterizations are merely relative to times. B-Theorists usually
talk about a different set of temporal relations: earlier than, simultaneous with, and
later than.
Now, suppose I deny that the universe had a beginning. Craig would then
say that I’m committed to the existence of an actually infinite number of
things – namely, the infinite number of past events. If Craig is right, then I either
have to give up my belief that the universe never began to exist, or else I have to
give up my earlier concession that an actually infinite number of things cannot
exist. But suppose I’m a presentist. As Craig himself characterized the view in the
quoted passage above, a presentist doesn’t believe that past events exist. So a
presentist who denies that the universe began to exist is not thereby committed to
the existence of an actually infinite number of past events. As a presentist, I would
simply respond to Craig by reminding him that, in my view, past events don’t exist
at all – so there’s no way I’m committed to an infinite number of them existing.
Thus, the absurdity Craig was aiming for with his argument does not result if we
accept presentism. Recall that the absurdity was supposed to result for anyone
who believes, contrary to (A), that the number of things that exist is actually
infinite.
Perhaps, then, the Hilbert’s Hotel argument could be geared towards
proponents of a B-Theory of time, since that view would maintain that past
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events really exist. But at the very least, the A-Theorist should be off the hook here.
If Craig is correct that the A-Theory entails a commitment to presentism, and if a
presentist can easily reject HHA on the grounds that premise (A) presupposes the
falsity of presentism, it follows that the argument is ineffective against a proponent
of the A-Theory. One might well conclude that Craig is presupposing the B-Theory
in his defence of HHA.
This might not appear too problematic if Craig were to go on to defend the truth
of the B-Theory. The problem, however, is that he is a committed A-Theorist and
presentist (Craig (b), –). This means that, by his own lights, the
argument should not be accepted. Furthermore, aside from HHA, Craig uses a
second, independent philosophical argument for premise () of the kalam
cosmological argument, and he is explicitly clear in his writings that this other
argument depends upon the truth of the A-Theory. Writing about one of the
premises of this argument, he says: ‘As obvious as this premise may seem at first
blush, it is, in fact, a matter of great controversy. It presupposes once again an
A-Theory of time’ (Craig & Sinclair (), ). Moreover, the kalam
cosmological argument as a whole depends upon the truth of the A-Theory,
according to Craig:
From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of
time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual
at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is
finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never
really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is
misconceived. (ibid., –)
In short, then, in defending these arguments Craig is presupposing inconsistent
metaphysical views. When he defends the first philosophical argument in support
of (), HHA, he seems to presuppose the B-Theory, and when he defends the
second philosophical argument in support of () he presupposes the A-Theory.
And since the kalam argument as a whole requires the A-Theory, Craig’s defence
of HHA falls flat.
Craig’s response
Mymain contention in the previous section was that Craig’s use of Hilbert’s
Hotel is ineffective against proponents of the A-Theory of time, as long as the only
viable version of the A-Theory is presentism. This is because a presentist who
claims that the universe is past-eternal is not committed to the existence of an
actually infinite number of events. Past events, on that view, don’t exist at all.
In a recent defence of the kalam cosmological argument co-authored by Craig
and James Sinclair, the authors responded to a related worry. According to them,
both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas accepted (i) the presentist view that past
events don’t actually exist, and therefore (ii) the notion that ‘the series of past
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events [is] a potential infinite’ rather than an actual infinite (Craig & Sinclair
(), ). Note that these are two separate contentions. I have been arguing
that (i), all by itself, is sufficient to cause major problems for HHA.
In responding to Aristotle and Aquinas, it seems to me that Craig and Sinclair
unfortunately latch onto (ii) and utterly neglect (i). They write: ‘The question,
then, is whether events’ temporal distribution over the past on a presentist
ontology precludes our saying that the number of events in a beginningless series
of events is actually infinite’ (ibid.). Surely this is a question. But I’mnot convinced
it’s the question. One could agree with Craig and Sinclair that, even on a presentist
ontology, if the universe didn’t begin to exist, then there have been an infinite
number of events. But this does nothing to ease the worry raised by (i), which
I take to be the more important problem here. Even though, in such a scenario,
the number of events that have occurred is actually infinite, the fact remains that
on a presentist ontology none of those events exist. Recall that the entire
argument was predicated on the notion that an actually infinite number of things
cannot exist.
Wes Morriston has made the point that the absurdity of Hilbert’s Hotel results
from the fact that every member of an infinite set exists at once, and is able to be
moved about in relation to one another (Morriston (), ). As we have seen,
the doctrine of presentism presents a problem for Craig if he wants to use the
thought-experiment to argue that the number of past events must be finite. But
there’s another problem lurking here as well. Morriston has pointed out that past
events cannot be shuffled around in the way that hotel guests can, which vitiates
Craig’s attempted use of the thought-experiment (ibid., –). Craig’s response
to this point is worth considering. He insists that in order to see the absurdity you
don’t need to be able to manipulate the objects in that fashion. He says:
Let’s suppose Hilbert’s Hotel is a hotel where, say, all the rooms are locked, so that people
can’t move out of them. Or maybe there are no doors to the rooms, so that you have an
infinite number of rooms, one person in each room, but there’s no doors . . . You can still
imagine what it would be like for [the] person in room one to be in room two, and for the
person to room two – he could be in room four. And you’ll generate the same absurdities.
You don’t have to actually go through the trouble of moving the people physically.
(Craig () )
This response is surely strange, given what Craig has written elsewhere. Consider a
separate worry for the Hilbert’s Hotel argument that goes something like this:
mathematicians know full well that you can’t subtract infinities, yet the illustration
supposes we ‘subtract’ an infinite number of guests as they check out from the
hotel. On this point, Craig writes: ‘In trans-finite arithmetic, inverse operations of
subtraction and division are prohibited because they lead to contradictions; but in
reality, one cannot stop people from checking out of the hotel if they so desire!’
(Craig (a), ). Yet, notice that this is precisely what Craig is now doing in
response to Morriston’s objection – namely, imagining the thought-experiment in
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such a way that the people are prevented from being able to check out of the hotel.
If the thought-experiment is described so that the guests are free to switch rooms
and check out of the hotel, then it isn’t analogous to past events, which can’t be
moved around in relation to one another. And if the thought-experiment is
redescribed, in the way Craig imagines, to make it more analogous to past events,
then it comes with a cost: Craig can no longer claim that the hotel guests are free to
check out in response to the objection that you can’t subtract infinities. Craig
thereby sacrifices his response to one objection in his attempt to respond to
another objection.
Let’s set this problem aside and refocus our attention on the problem that
presentism poses for Craig. One way for Craig to respond to this objection,
suggested by his response to the previous objection, is to claim that it doesn’t
matter whether or not the past events exist, as long as they can be numbered.
Indeed, he claims that since past events can be counted, we can simply run a
Hilbert’s Hotel-style thought-experiment using an infinite number of past events
rather than an infinite number of hotel rooms. The way to carry out this sort
of procedure is, first, to number the events mentally, starting with the present
and working our way back. Then, we simply note the same sorts of absurdities
that attended the original thought-experiment. In Craig’s words, if the past is
eternal,
then there have occurred as many odd-numbered events as events. If we mentally take away
all the odd-numbered events, there are still an infinite number of events left over; but if we
take away all of the events greater than three, there are only four events left, even though in
both cases we took away the same number of events. (Craig & Sinclair (), )
But all of this is supposed to be metaphysically absurd, just like Hilbert’s Hotel.
And it’s supposed to give us reason to reject the view that there are an actually
infinite number of past events.
This response won’t work for a couple of reasons. First, if we accept this line of
argument it looks like we’ll have to accept a parallel argument that shows that the
universe cannot be future-eternal. We can mentally number future events and
do the same operations to them. So if Craig’s argument shows that time must have
a beginning, then a parallel argument shows that time must come to an end. But
this is unacceptable. Surely the argument doesn’t really prove such a thing as that!
Craig might want to claim that we can’t count events that haven’t yet occurred,
whereas we can count events that have occurred. This is false. If we construe
events as ‘equal intervals of time’, then we can surely mentally number and count
future events just as easily as we can past events. Or consider Morriston’s proposal
that God decrees that two angels take turns praising him for a minute at a time for
eternity (Morriston (), ). I suggest it would not be too difficult to number
these events mentally and then mentally shuffle things around in the way Craig is
doing for past events.
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Craig’s preferred response here is to argue that although time will never come to
an end, the series of future events is nevertheless only potentially infinite, not
actually infinite (Craig (b) ). Thus, our Hilbert’s Hotel-style reasoning would
not apply to the future. This is a mistake. If the angels will be taking turns praising
God forever, then the number of future praises must be the same as the number of
past praises given the assumption that they have been taking turns praising God
for an eternity. Craig insists that the number in the latter case is actually infinite.
But if that’s right, then he cannot deny that the number in the former case is
actually infinite as well, since the past praises and the future praises can be put in
a one-to-one correspondence. Craig’s insistence that the future praises are not
real is irrelevant, since past events aren’t real either on the presentist view.
Nevertheless, as Craig himself points out, we can still mentally number them and
generate (alleged) absurdities. But since nobody thinks this argument seriously
shows that time must come to an end, we shouldn’t think it shows that time must
have had a beginning, either.
The second reason this line of response won’t work to Craig’s advantage is that
it’s not clear whether the revised thought-experiment results in a metaphysical
absurdity like Hilbert’s Hotel. Hilbert’s Hotel was absurd because of the
counterintuitive implications that resulted from having an actually infinite number
of things existing all at once. To claim that the same absurdity can be generated
with an actually infinite number of non-existing things like past events makes
it seem like Craig’s complaint is with the mathematical legitimacy of infinity,
not just the idea that the actual infinite is instantiated in reality. It’s true that
the number of past events is the same as the number of even past events, in
Craig’s scenario, and this is a straightforward implication of saying that the
number of past events is actually infinite. But what is metaphysically absurd
about this, if the events don’t exist? It still remains that the only conclusion we’re
able to draw from the absurdities that are generated frommentally numbering and
then mentally shuffling past events is this: an infinite number of past events
cannot exist. And as we’ve seen, the presentist is already on board with that,
regardless of whether or not she thinks that an infinite number of them have
occurred.
Because HHA has been variously formulated, Craig might concede that a
presentist would be unaffected by the contention that an actually infinite number
of things cannot exist. Instead, he might say, we should examine the second
formulation of HHA:
(A*) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(A*) A beginningless series of equal past intervals of time is an actual
infinite.
(A*) Therefore, a beginningless series of equal past intervals of time
cannot exist.
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Although the presentist escapes the original argument by avoiding a commitment
to an infinite number of things existing, this alternative formulation doesn’t
explicitly say anything about an infinite number of things existing, but instead talks
about the existence of actual infinites themselves.
To assess this response, we need to ask what premises (A*) and (A*) are
supposed to mean, and whether adequate support has been provided for them.
First, we’d want to know what it means to say that ‘an actual infinite cannot exist’.
The most natural interpretation of this claim seems to be that an actually infinite
number of things cannot exist. Yet we’ve already seen the problem that
accompanies this formulation of the premise, since it allows presentists (Craig
included) off the hook. We want to find a reading of this premise which doesn’t
have this defect. So what can it mean to say that ‘an actual infinite cannot exist’
which does not reduce to ‘an actually infinite number of things cannot exist’? If we
speak of things this way, then it apparently must be the case that, if an actual
infinite could exist, then it could exist even when the number of existing things is
finite. One way of helping us get a grip on this is to ask what way of formulating
the argument will allow Craig to get what he wants – namely, the conclusion that
there cannot have been an actually infinite number of events prior to now. Here’s
a first approximation of the principle he needs:
(M*) It is metaphysically impossible for there to be a time before which an actually infinite
number of things have existed.
With that in mind, we can see that (M*) would help Craig’s argument go through.
But what reason has he given (or could he give) in support of this principle? Recall
that Hilbert’s Hotel was an illustration in which an actually infinite number of
rooms existed all at once. At best, that could justify (M) from earlier, but it leaves
open the possibility that (M*) is false. What we’d need is some other illustration
which shows that an actually infinite number of things cannot even compose a
series in which almost all of the things no longer exist.
One possibility is briefly mentioned by Craig and Sinclair, in their article from
The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology:
Aquinas’ own example of a blacksmith working from eternity who uses one hammer after
another as each one breaks furnishes a good example of an actual infinite, for the collection
of all the hammers employed by the smith is an actual infinite. The fact that the broken
hammers still exist is incidental to the story; even if they had all been destroyed after
being broken, the number of hammers broken by the smith is the same. (Craig & Sinclair
(), )
While I again agree with Craig that the number of hammer-breaking events in
such a scenario is actually infinite, it’s not clear to me whether such a scenario is
really impossible. If the blacksmith has been making a new hammer out of new
materials each time his old hammer breaks, then presumably the world would be
populated with an actually infinite number of broken hammer pieces. This can be
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ruled out by the use of a ‘Hilbert’s Hammer Collection’ thought-experiment, as I
granted earlier in the article. But if the blacksmith has been merely fixing the same
hammer every time it breaks, then I’m not yet convinced that the scenario is
impossible. Something moremust be said to motivate the intuition that the eternal
blacksmith scenario is absurd (i.e. metaphysically impossible). While I of course
find the scenario hard to fathom, it’s no more difficult to imagine than any other
past-eternal scenario. And, in any case, it’s hard for me to fathom either a world
without beginning or a world with an absolute beginning. So I’ll leave it to Craig to
offer up some other thought-experiment to justify (M*).
Yet another avenue is open to Craig to respond to our hypothetical presentist.
Craig might claim that, since the argument would obviously work to show that the
past is finite given the B-Theory of time (in which all events are equally real), it’s
plausible to think that it must work for the A-Theorist as well (ibid., ). After
all, how could one’s metaphysical theory of time make a difference to whether
past events are finite or infinite in number? It would be strange indeed if
one’s acceptance of the B-Theory forced her to conclude that the universe had
a beginning, whereas her acceptance of the A-Theory would have kept open the
possibility of a past-eternal universe. We can formulate this line of argument as
follows:
(C) If HHA is sound given the B-Theory, then it’s sound given the
A-Theory.
(C) HHA is sound given the B-Theory.
(C) Therefore, HHA is sound given the A-Theory.
And here I think there’s at least some plausibility to premise (C). But one
person’s modus ponens is, of course, another person’s modus tollens. I think the
following argument is more compelling:
(C) If HHA is sound given the B-Theory, then it’s sound given the
A-Theory.
* (C) HHA is not sound given the A-Theory.
* (C) Therefore, HHA is not sound given the B-Theory.
It seems to me that we have at least as much reason to accept* (C) as we have to
accept (C). I’ve shown, taking words straight from Craig’s own writings, that there
is a clear inconsistency in what he says about the A-Theory and presentism on the
one hand and HHA on the other.
On a similar note, one can see in Craig’s more recent writings that he tries
dealing with the problem we’ve raised by noting that, on a ‘growing block’ theory
of time, the objection can’t even get off the ground, since that view posits that
past events do exist (ibid. and Craig (b), ). And he’s right about that. The
primary objection I’ve been pressing in this article wouldn’t have got any traction
if we were evaluating how a growing block theorist could reply to HHA. But I don’t
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see how this helps Craig’s case, since he is a presentist, not a growing block
theorist. If I agree with Craig that presentism really is the only coherent version of
the A-Theory, then I’ve got to examine how the argument fares against my own
position. Craig’s argument should not sway the presentist, even if it should sway
the growing block theorist. Craig could, I suppose, renounce presentism and start
endorsing a view that he’s previously said was incoherent. Otherwise, I can’t see
how the growing block theory is going to offer any comfort to Craig, who remains a
presentist.
Lastly, Craig has recently offered one other response that might apply to the
presentist’s objection. He claims that on a presentist ontology, past events still
have some sort of ontological status not shared by future events. He writes:
Everything that has happened has been actualized. As the medievals put it, these events
have exited from their causes and are therefore no longer in potentiality. The actual world
thus includes both what does exist and what did exist. But events which have yet to take
place, being pure potentialities, are, on a tensed view of time, not part of the actual
world . . . Even if past events do not exist, they are still part of the actual world in a way that
future events are not, since the actual world comprises everything that has happened.
(Craig (b), )
In context, Craig is here arguing against Morriston’s claim that HHA commits
Craig to the view that the future must be finite. Craig is trying to show that there is
a relevant difference between the past and the future which allows the argument
against the infinite past to go through but which does not similarly apply to the
future. The strategy is to say that, although neither past nor future events exist, past
events are part of the actual world, whereas future events are not. Might this
strategy help Craig overcome the problem that HHA is unsound given the truth of
presentism? After all, if Craig is right, then the presentist who believes that the
universe is past-eternal is positing a world in which, so to speak, an infinite
number of things have appeared on the radar – that is, an infinite number of things
belong to that world in some sense.
It’s not clear to me why this should be a problem – i.e. why I should be
motivated to reject the notion that the actual world is something to which an
actually infinite number of past events belong, in some sense. The past events
aren’t real, according to the presentist; they don’t exist. By positing such a world
as this, we are not thereby embracing the (allegedly) absurd conclusion that an
actually infinite number of things exist, as was the case with Hilbert’s Hotel. So I
don’t know what the problem is supposed to be. Whatever else can be said against
this line of response on Craig’s behalf, HHA would need to be reformulated if he
wants to use this ontology to overcome our objection. Here’s a rough sketch of
how Craig could reformulate HHA:
(D) There cannot be a world in which an actually infinite number of things
have been actualized.
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(D) If the actual world is one in which the universe is past-eternal, then
there is a world in which an actually infinite number of things have
been actualized.
(D) Therefore, the actual world cannot be one in which the universe is
past-eternal.
While this argument might be worth investigating, I’mnot convinced that Hilbert’s
Hotel applies to the relevant premise (D). I’ll leave it to Craig to prove
otherwise.
Conclusion
Craig’s philosophical arguments for a finite past are crucial for the success
of the kalam cosmological argument. In this article we’ve looked at one of two
such arguments Craig has defended. We’ve found that the argument is powerless
against proponents of presentism. And if Craig is correct to equate the A-Theory
with presentism, then the argument is ineffective against the A-Theorist. Since
Craig’s other argument for premise (), as well as the kalam cosmological
argument in general, depends upon the truth of the A-Theory, it turns out that
these arguments are in tension with one another. The possible lines of response
that we’ve looked at are not sufficient to overcome the force of the objection.
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Notes
. The specific wording of this argument tends to vary slightly depending on the publication.
. Abstract objects, Craig reminds us, cannot stand in causal relations.
. Craig (a) has stated:
The primary argument[s] that I give for the finitude of the past are philosophical
arguments – based on the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things,
and then secondly on the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. So I
see the scientific evidence as merely confirmatory of a conclusion that has already been reached
on the basis of philosophical arguments.
. We need to keep this fact firmly in mind. Craig cannot determine that the cause was timeless unless he
shows that time had a beginning, and that the beginning of time had a cause. Throughout this article,
when I speak of the hypothesis that the universe is past-eternal, that can be read as the hypothesis that
time is past-eternal.
. Although I cannot defend that thesis here, a good basic sketch of some of the reasons that convince me
can be found in (Morriston (), -). Craig has similarly stated that time could have preceded
the existence of the universe, which makes me wonder how strong he thinks the empirical evidence can
possibly be for establishing that time had an absolute beginning (Craig (a) ).
. Moreover, there’s yet another formulation of the argument to be found in a more recent publication.
See (Craig & Sinclair (), ), where the second premise in the argument is stated: ‘An infinite
temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.’ It’s not entirely clear to me what (if anything) hangs on
the different formulations of these premises, or why Craig has been motivated to state the argument in
so many different ways.
. Craig is thinking of a divergent sequence which tends to infinity. A potential infinite is a collection
that is increasing such that the number of its members will eventually be larger than K, for any real
number K.
. I’m ignoring the fact that such actions as moving into and out of a room would take time, especially
when one must travel extremely long distances (light years?) to reach the room that’s twice the
number of one’s current room, once the room number is sufficiently high. Perhaps God could shuffle
the guests about instantaneously, so that this would not be a worry. In any case, I won’t worry about
it here.
. Craig is welcome to explain how such a thought experiment would work, if he cares to go this route.
Here’s a possibility: imagine a realm with an actually infinite number of numbers. Now suppose a new
number comes along wanting to be added to the collection. In this case, we simply need to shift all of
the other numbers around in such-and-such a way, and as a result we will have accommodated the
new number. Or suppose a number decides to leave this Platonic Heaven. Nevertheless, the same
number of numbers remains as before. I confess that this thought experiment doesn’t make any sense
to me, and it gives me no intuitions about whether there can be a Platonic Heaven.
. We should keep in mind that every argument in favour of Platonism (at least those versions which
include an infinite number of abstract objects) counts against (A). Craig seems to think the burden
of proof here is on his opponents to prove Platonism and rebut all of the alternatives (Craig (a),
-).
. I’m not sure whether Plantinga explicitly commits himself to saying that the number of worlds is
actually infinite in any of his publications, but he confirmed this via email on  June .
. For Lewis’s view of possible worlds, see Lewis (). On the number of worlds, see Lewis (), n.
Of course, I have granted for the sake of argument that there cannot be an actually infinite number of
concrete objects, which would rule out Lewis’s view.
. A good discussion of these issues, and more, can be found in Morriston ().
. Surely it would be strange to talk about an hour or a minute coming into existence and passing out of
existence. When would an hour come into existence? When would it cease to exist? An hour later?
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Would we want to say that the nine o’clock hour comes into existence at ., and passes out of
existence at .?
. Thanks to Christopher Gibilisco for suggesting this example.
. Thanks to David Chavez for some helpful discussion regarding this difficulty for Craig’s argument.
. This is how Craig presents the argument, at least. I should note that he need not claim something so
strong. He could try to argue merely that a past-eternal universe would entail that it’s metaphysically
possible that an actually infinite number of things exist. (Thanks to Wes Morriston for bringing this
possibility to my attention.) I have my doubts about such an argument, but perhaps it will end up being
better than HHA.
. At this point, I should remind the reader that some metaphysicians deny that events exist – and
plausibly so, according to Craig (b, ). But if we believe that events don’t exist, what should we
make of Craig’s claim that proponents of a past-eternal universe are committed to the existence of an
actually infinite number of past events?
. It’s been suggested by Richard Field that, given presentism, Aristotle and Aquinas were correct to deny
that the past was an actual infinite. As Field (an apparent presentist) puts the point: ‘The past is not
actual.’ I suspect that this may be a purely semantic dispute between Field and Craig. For Craig, I take
it, the past events don’t have to exist in order to be correctly described as an ‘actual infinite’ in the
sense that he means to use that term. Nevertheless, I admit that it is puzzling to think of non-existing
things (past events) forming a ‘collection’, which is what Craig has to do in order to consider the series
of past events as an ‘actual infinite’, by his definition of that term. Craig must be taking non-existing
things to be definite and discrete members of a collection, and it seems to me that Field is right to
question whether that is coherent. Is there a collection of unicorns, even though unicorns do not exist?
Or would Craig say that the dinosaurs that once lived on this planet form a collection? Does the
collection now exist even though the dinosaurs don’t? I admit that I’m puzzled by all this, and I think
Craig owes us an explanation for why we should think of past events as forming a collection given
presentism. We could perhaps raise the worry by imagining a presentist’s reply to Craig:
I think the universe is past-eternal, but it’s not clear to me why you think I’m committed to the
notion that there exists a collection of past events with an infinite number of definite and discrete
members. In what sense am I committed to believing that such a collection exists, given that
I don’t think any of the members of that alleged ‘collection’ exist?
For Field’s take on the present argument, which is very much in line with my own (and to which I owe a great
debt of gratitude), along with Craig’s response to Field, see Craig (a).
. Thanks to Wes Morriston for making this point in commenting on an earlier draft of this article.
. In conversation, Craig has responded by insisting that an actually infinite number of things can neither
exist nor have existed. Here, I think, we should question whether Craig has given any convincing reason
to believe this new claim.
. Imagine the presentist again, who claims that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist, yet that
there have been an actually infinite number of past events (which no longer exist). Craig needs to rule
out such a view. So the series of past events, none of which exist, is said to compose an actual infinite,
and the series is therefore rejected as metaphysically impossible. The point is that the series must be
taken to be something over and above its members, since the series ‘exists’ on the hypothetical
presentist’s view, but the members of the series don’t.
. By this I just mean to say that there have been an infinite number of such events, not that past events
are ‘actual’ in any sort of metaphysical sense. See my comments in note .
. It’s worth mentioning, though, that, in his debates at least, Craig has fallen into the habit of speaking of
past events as ‘real’, despite what he says in his writings (e.g. the passage characterizing presentism,
quoted earlier). See his opening statement in his  debate with Stephen Law, or his opening
statement from his  debate with Peter Millican.
. I should mention one last line of argument on Craig’s behalf, which was originally brought to my
attention by William Demsar. A presentist might be inclined to say that we need presently existing
‘tensed facts’ to serve as truth-makers for past-tensed propositions. If this is so, then if the universe is
past-eternal, there would presumably be an actually infinite number of such facts. Isn’t such an
outcome absurd? Since I don’t have the space here to assess this argument fully, I’ll simply respond by
noting four things. First, the account of truth-makers would need to be filled out in order to see
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whether this is a problem that only arises if the universe is past-eternal. After all, if there would still be
an actually infinite number of such facts even on the supposition that the universe began to exist a
finite time ago, then this line of argument would prove too much! Second, if there are truths about the
future, and if each of these truths requires a presently existing truth-maker, then this argument would
seem to entail that the future cannot be infinite. Third, speaking for myself, it doesn’t seem intuitively
absurd to me that there could be an infinite number of facts. If facts count as things, then we should go
back and question our earlier concession that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist. Fourth,
Craig himself does not accept the sort of truth-maker account that Demsar has in mind (Craig (personal
communication) and Craig (a) ). Presentists like Craig sometimes deny that truths about the past
and future require truth-makers.
. A very early version of this article was presented as a paper at a philosophy graduate student
colloquium at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. A later version was presented at the  Midwest
Evangelical Philosophical Society meeting. I’d like to thank everyone who attended those talks and
discussed the paper with me during Q&A. The article has benefited from the helpful comments and
advice of numerous individuals: Patrick Arnold, William Demsar, Luke Elwonger, Richard Field, Greg
Janzen, Robin Le Poidevin, Chris Tweedt, and an anonymous referee for Religious Studies. Especially
helpful were extensive comments on earlier drafts provided by Christopher Gibilisco, Wes Morriston,
Adam Thompson, and Preston Werner. Lastly, I must thank David Chavez for suggesting the title.
 LANDON HEDR ICK
